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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: Recovery of Payments Made
Pursuant To A Subsequently Reversed Award
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Treadwell'
Millicent Treadwell was employed by Roy Sandstrom, who carried
Workmen's Compensation insurance with the St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company.2 Mrs. Treadwell was injured when she attempted
to remove a suitcase from the back seat of her car while still seated in
the front; this was an act which she had performed on several previous
occasions without injury. She brought a Workmen's Compensation
claim against her employer, Mr. Sandstrom, and his insurer, St. Paul,
alleging that she had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of her employment with Mr. Sandstrom.'
1. 263 Md. 430, 283 A.2d 601 (1971).
2. Hereinafter referred to as "St. Paul."
3. It is essential that these elements be present for the injuries to be compensable.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1972) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67(b)
(1964).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Commission ruled that
she had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course
of her employment, and issued an order to this effect dated August
21, 1968, which compelled the employer and the insurer to proceed
with the payment of compensation. The employer and the insurer filed
an appeal of the Commission's decision in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County, Maryland, on September 13, 1968, but were never-
theless obligated to pay the award because the Maryland Workmen's
Compensation Act provides that an appeal shall not be a stay of an
order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission directing payment
of compensation.' Consequently, the insurer proceeded to pay the
claimant's medical bills and also paid to her directly the sum of
$2,867.86 in disability payments.
On June 11, 1969, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
ruled that Treadwell had not sustained an "accidental injury" and
reversed the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission,5
whereupon St. Paul filed suit, seeking to recover the money which it
had been required to pay pending the appeal of the Commission's order.
Treadwell demurred, alleging that the payments had been made pur-
suant to a valid Workmen's Compensation order and that under Mary-
land law, a suit filed for the recovery of such payments was prohibited,
despite the fact that the order was ultimately reversed on appeal. The
circuit court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. On ap-
peal the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that one who
makes workmen's compensation payments under an order which is
subsequently reversed is not entitled to recover them.
I.
A few preliminary observations about Workmen's Compensation
in Maryland are helpful to understanding the reasoning of the court.
Generally speaking, the Maryland Act6 is similar to those of other
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(a) (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
Any employer, employee, beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved by any de-
cision of the Commission . . . may have the same reviewed by a proceeding in
the nature of an appeal in the circuit court. . . . If the court shall determine
that the Commission has acted within its powers and has correctly construed
the law and the facts, the decision of the Commission shall be confirmed; other-
wise it shall be reversed or modified. . . . An appeal shall not be a stay of an
order of the Commission directing payment of compensation or the furnishing of
medical treatment. . . . All appeals from the Commission shall have precedence
over all cases except criminal cases.
5. Treadwell v. Sandstrom, Civil No. 25,322 Law (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cty.,
June 11, 1969).
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 1-84 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1972).
[VOL. XXXII
1973] ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. Co. v. TREADWELL 429
states.7 First enacted in 1914, it is a comprehensive legislative plan to
alleviate one of the social ills associated with the Industrial Revolu-
tion,' that is, the inevitability of accidents in industry coupled with the
inadequacy of the common law rules of tort liability for providing
relief to injured employees. Prior to the passage of the Maryland Act
an injured employee's only recourse was to bring an action wherein
he had to establish the negligence of his employer. In addition to the
difficulty in proving such negligence, the employee was confronted with
the harsh common law defenses of contributory negligence, fellow
servant negligence and assumption of risk.9
The Workmen's Compensation Act abolished the common law
rules and substituted a statutory scheme intended to be the employee's
exclusive remedy against the employer.10 Recovery is determined
without regard to fault, 1 and therefore the contributory negligence of
the employee is not a defense. Once the preliminary test as to whether
an employee is covered by the Act is satisfied, the Act provides for
payments of a certain and definite amount each week, determined on
the basis of the employee's disability and his average weekly wage. 12
In addition, the Act provides for payments for medical treatment and
services, and funeral expenses in the event of death.13
Satisfying the preliminary statutory requirements for recovery,
however, can confront an injured employee with serious difficulty.
Even if the particular employer-employee relationship is covered by
7. The Maryland Act contains those provisions which the typical Workmen's
Compensation Act contains. These features are set out in A. LARSON, THE LAW OP
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1972) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. They include a
basic principle that an employee is automatically entitled to certain benefits whenever
he suffers a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment. Id. § 6. Moreover, the negligence and fault of both employer and employee
are largely immaterial. Id. § 30. Coverage is limited to persons having the status of an
employee, as distinguished from that of an independent contractor. Id. § 43. The bene-
fits to the employee include cash wage benefits which are usually about one-half to two-
fifths of the average weekly wage, payment of hospital and medical expenses and
death benefits to dependents. Id. §§ 57-61. Furthermore, the employee gives up his
right to sue his employer [Id. §§ 65-71], and the administration of the program is
handled by a commission with its own rules of procedure and evidence. Id. § 5.
8. See ch. 800, Preamble [1914] Md. Laws 1429. See also M. PRESSMAN,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND (1970).
9. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971).
10. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1972). See also American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584, 187 A.2d
864 (1963).
11. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1972). See also Baltimore Dry
Docks & Shipbuilding Co. v. Webster, 139 Md. 616, 116 A. 842 (1922); American
Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 97 A. 999 (1916).
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36 (Supp. 1972).
13. Id. § 37.
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the Act, 4 the injury must be accidental and must arise out of and in
the course of the employment in order to be compensable.' 5
Interpretation of these terms has sown confusion among em-
ployers, employees, their counsel and the courts alike. For example,
the Maryland courts have fashioned a rather strictly defined concept
of "accidental injury." Unlike many other jurisdictions which merely
require that for an injury to be accidental it need only be the unex-
pected result of normal activity,' 6 in Maryland the phrase "accidental
injury" does not include unexpected results not produced by accidental
causes. Instead, Maryland courts have consistently held that for an
injury to be accidental, it must result from some unusual strain or
exertion of the employee or some unusual condition of the employ-
ment.' 7 Thus, if a Maryland workman were to admit that he had
performed the act previously without being injured, it is very likely
that an injury on a subsequent occasion from an identical act would
not be found to be an accidental injury within the coverage of the
Maryland Act.' 8 Consequently, it is apparent that the interpretation
14. The Act covers most normal employer-employee relationships, with specified
exemptions for certain classes of employment such as domestic employment, short
term single-employee relationships, voluntary employment in return for aid or suste-
nance from charitable or religious organizations, relationships covered by federal
liability acts, "casual" employment, and various types of voluntary and non-salaried
occupations. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 21 (Supp. 1972). See also MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 31 (Supp. 1972), which provides, inter alia, that employer-employee
relationships not automatically covered by the Act may be subjected to it by the
joint election of the employer and employee.
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1972) ; See, e.g., Rieger v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 211 Md. 214, 126 A.2d 598 (1956) ; Perdue v. Brittingham,
186 Md. 393, 47 A.2d 491 (1946).
16. See, e.g., Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So. 2d 790 (1942) (hernia
caused by "ordinary lifting in the usual manner" held an injury by accident) ; Bussey
v. Glove Indemnity Co., 81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34 (1950) (cerebral hemorrhage
five minutes after climbing ordinary stairs; usual strain theory accepted).
17. See, e.g., Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. McLaughlin, 11 Md. App. 360,
274 A.2d 390 (1971), where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that a
vascular insufficiency of the left carotid artery and resulting paralysis, suffered by a
labor foreman in the course of a heated tongue-lashing by foreman's supervisor who
had wheeled around with his hands clenched when foreman complained, was an unex-
pected result not produced by an accidental cause as the foreman was engaging in the
usual performance of his duties and that the argument could not by itself constitute
an unusual strain or exertion on the foreman's part.
18. This is precisely what happened in Mrs. Treadwell's case. She had by her
own admission performed the same act several times before. The circuit court con-
cluded on this basis that her injury was not accidental. See Brief for Appellant,
Appendix A at E.2. See also Rieger v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 211
Md. 214, 126 A.2d 598 (1956), where the court denied a pipe fitter compensation for
a back injury suffered while tightening bolts in the same manner as he had been
doing for two months prior to the injury.
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placed by the Maryland court upon the term "accidental" encourages
employees to be less than frank about the circumstances of their in-
juries. It is equally apparent that attorneys representing injured em-
ployees are placed in the unenviable ethical position of having to decide
whether to inform a client of the enormously consequential effect of a
seemingly harmless prevarication.
The requirement that the accident arise "out of" and "in the course
of" the employment has also been the subject of considerable judicial
definition. For an injury to "arise out of the employment," it must
be caused by a peculiar or increased risk to which the employee, as
distinct from the general public, is subjected by his employment.'" It
does not include an injury which cannot be traced to the employment
as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to
which the workman would have been exposed away from the employ-
ment.2" Distinct from, but interrelated with the "arising out of" ques-
tion is the requirement that the accident arise "in the course of the
employment." An injury arising in the course of employment is one
which occurs while the workman is performing the duty which he is
employed to perform at a place where he reasonably may be in the
performance of his duties.'
Concomitant to the development of complicated tests for the avail-
ability of benefits has been the growing importance of the right to ap-
peal the initial decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Under the Act, an employee, beneficiary, employer or insurer has the
right to appeal,22 although an appeal will not act to stay an award. 23
In upholding the validity of the "no stay" provision, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, in Branch v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North
America" explained:
19. See, e.g., Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 212 A.2d 324 (1965) where
the court denied compensation to an employee injured on the sidewalk by an auto-
mobile which had gone out of control.
20. See, e.g., Klein v. Terra Chems. Int'l, Inc., 14 Md. App. 172, 286 A.2d 568
(1972) where the Maryland Court of Appeals denied compensation to the widow of
an employee whose death was caused by choking on meat eaten at a business dinner.
21. Whereas the Maryland courts have strictly construed the term "accidental,"
they have applied a somewhat more liberal interpretation of the term "in the course
of." See, e.g., Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 90 A.2d 180 (1951) where injuries
suffered by a garbage collector who fell from his truck while his employer was giving
him an after-hours ride into town were held to have occurred "in the course of" his
employment. This case expresses a common Workmen's Compensation doctrine
identified by the court as the "going and coming" rule, which was first accepted by
the Maryland court in Harrison v. Central Construction Corp., 135 Md. 170, 108 A.
874 (1919).
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(a) (Supp. 1972).
23. See note 4 supra.
24. 156 Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929).
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Its design was to ensure speedy, as well as certain, relief in proper
cases within the scope of its application. That humanitarian policy
would be seriously hampered if the weekly payments of compen-
sation awarded by the commission could be suspended because of
an appeal. In providing that an appeal should not be a stay the
statute was simply adopting a necessary expedient to accomplish
one of the important purposes for which it was enacted.25
In addition to ensuring this goal, the "no stay" clause removed the
possibility that an employer might abuse the right to appeal by using
it to stall payments in an attempt to force a needy injured workman
to compromise his claim for an amount lower than that to which he
was entitled.
The possible consequences of this provision, the policy of providing
quick relief to the workman and the sometimes harsh effect of the tests
for the availability of benefits were factors which confronted the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in Treadwell as it attempted to determine whether
payments made by the insurer pending appeal could be "recovered back"
when the award was reversed. In addition, the court was hampered by
the lack of any legislative records from which it might seek to glean
the intent of the General Assembly with respect to "recovery back."
II.
The opinion of the court, although it reaches a result which is
ostensibly consistent with the humanitarian object of the Act, is not a
particularly satisfying one. The reasoning of the court is based upon a
number of questionable assumptions and conclusions. First, the court
stated that the weight of authority seemed to support the notion that pay-
ments such as those made in Treadwell could not be recovered.26 It ap-
pears that the cases cited in support of this proposition in fact deal with
clearly distinguishable situationsY. In several of the cases cited, pay-
ments had been made by an employer prior to an order by a compensa-
25. 156 Md. at 489, 144 A. at 698.
26. 263 Md. at 432, 283 A.2d at 602.
27. Two of these cases are distinguishable on their facts. In Brakus v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Indus., 48 Wash. 2d 218, 292 P.2d 865 (1956), the Supreme Court
of Washington held that the Washington Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals had
no authority to decide issues not presented to it in a notice of appeal from a decision
of the Department of Labor and Industries. In dictum, the Washington court noted
that the Department could not recover amounts already paid. Id. at 866-67. As
authority for this dictum, the Washington court cited State v. Olson, 172 Wash. 424,
20 P.2d 850 (1933), which had held that the state could not, in the absence of fraud,
recover excessive payments made under a mistake of fact as to the extent of an
injury. In Sassarro v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 24 N.J. Misc. 57, 46 A.2d 52, 54
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tion commission; the courts held that such payments were gratuitous and
therefore not recoverable.2" In at least one jurisdiction it is specifically
provided by statute that voluntary payments constitute an admission of
liability and are not recoverable.29 The "voluntary payment" rule ap-
pears to apply in Maryland as well,"0 but it arises from considerations
different from those in Treadwell, where the payments were made under
compulsion of law.
The court next cited the case of Hoffman v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co., 31 as the closest the Maryland court had ever approached the
question presented in Treadwell. Hoffman concerned an insurer's at-
tempt to defeat an attorney's statutory lien on compensation pay-
ments. 2 Hoffman was the attorney for a claimant who was initially
awarded a forty-five percent partial disability of which the Commis-
sion found twenty percent to be due to pre-existing disability. Liberty
Mutual, the insurer, appealed the Commission's determination. While
the appeal was pending, Hoffman asserted his right to have his fee
placed in escrow out of the payments being made to the claimant, which
procedure was approved by the court. At the time the appeal was de-
cided, payments of $2,250 had been made to the claimant. The circuit
court held that the claimant was entitled to only thirty-five percent
(1946), there was also a dictum to the effect that overpayments could not be recovered.
The dicta in both cases dealt with situations in which overpayments had been made.
Thus, in both cases a valid compensation claim was present, while in Treadwell the
insurer sought to recover payments made pursuant to an order of the Compensation
Commission to an employee whose claim was later held completely invalid. See also
note 37 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Daoud v. Matz, 73 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1954) (payments made prior to award
cannot be recovered) ; Manning v. Gossett Mills, 192 S.C. 262, 6 S.E.2d 256 (1939)
(voluntary payment cannot be recovered); Rubino v. City of New York, 32 App.
Div. 2d 44, 299 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1969) (payments made by employer not chargeable to
order of Compensation Board and therefore not recoverable).
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-35-9 (1956).
30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pan Am. Airways (Workmen's Compensation Comm'n)
in The Daily Record (Baltimore), July 11, 1941, at 10, col. 5.
31. 232 Md. 51, 191 A.2d 575 (1963).
32. As the Hoffman court noted:
Code (1957, 1962 Cum. Supp.), Article 101, § 57 [now MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 57 (1964)] provides that if a claim for an attorney's fee is approved by the
Commission it shall become a lien upon the compensation awarded, but shall be
paid therefrom only in the manner fixed by the Commission. The Commission,
pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art 101, § 10 (1957), has promulgated rules and
regulations of procedure, one of which is Rule No. 22. This rule provides that
the filing of a petition for an attorney's fee with the Commission and service upon
the employer and insurer of a copy of the petition is notice to the employer and
insurer, to reserve in 'escrow' the amount of fee requested in such petition until
such time as the amount of the fee is determined by the Commission.
232 Md. at 55, 191 A.2d at 577.
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partial disability, twenty percent of which was the result of a pre-
existing disability. The financial result of this finding was that Liberty
Mutual had already paid the claimant $375 more than the revised
award entitled him to receive. When Hoffman then sued Liberty
Mutual for his fee, it replied that since it had already paid more than
it was obligated to pay under the revised award, it had no money with
which to satisfy Hoffman's claim.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, upon consideration of this argu-
ment, found that the statutory lien which had attached in Hoffman's
favor could not be defeated. To hold otherwise, it said, would be to
defeat the purpose of the statutory language concerning attorney's
liens. 3 In support of its conclusion the Hoffman court pointed out
that but for the escrow provision in the attorney's fee rule, the money
allegedly held in escrow would have been paid to the claimant under
the Commission's initial order. 4 To this it attached the dictum,
highlighted by Judge McWilliams in Treadwell, that "[c]ontrary to
appellee's contention, no money was owed by the claimant to appellee,
since an overpayment does not permit a recovery by the insurer in this
situation."'
As the Treadwell court pointed out, the Hoffman dictum "only
tangentially" applied to the facts of Treadwell. Several factors indi-
cated that the Treadwell court was wise in its decision not to rely
upon Hoffman. First, the Hoffman court cited Branch v. Indemnity
Insurance Co. of North America 6 to support its dictum; but nothing
in that case, which upheld the "no stay" provision in the Maryland
Act, either supports or weakens the dictum. Second, the dictum was
clearly not based on rigorous analysis, since it was itself only tangenti-
ally related to the issue in Hoffman, which was the validity of Hoff-
man's statutory lien. Finally, even if taken at face value, the dictum
concerns recovery of overpayments caused by reduction of an award,
a situation which is arguably distinguishable from recovery of pay-
ments made upon a claim later held to be invalid."
33. 232 Md. at 56, 191 A.2d at 578.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 156 Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929). See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
37. See Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Monello, 41 Misc. 2d 943, 246 N.Y.S.2d
645 (Civ. Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 44 Misc. 2d 588, 254 N.Y.S.2d 351
(App. T. 1st Dep't 1964), in which the plaintiff was the workmen's compensation
carrier for a company in which the defendant was a partner. The partner was in-
jured at work and filed a workmen's compensation claim for his injury, which claim
was paid by the plaintiff pursuant to a Workmen's Compensation Board order. Subse-
quently the Board disallowed the claim on the ground that a partner was not covered
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Although the latter distinction may seem unduly technical, it is a
difference which seems real in practice. The courts have often taken
a strict stand concerning overpayments, either refusing to allow any
recoupment or limiting such recoupment to a credit toward any pay-
ments not yet made.38 Furthermore, some statutes expressly provide
that a subsequent modification of an award "shall not affect moneys
already paid."3" This strict view seems understandable in view of the
fact that often an award is reduced because subsequent events showed
the initial diagnosis to be incorrect or because a workman's physical
condition has improved.
Realizing the weakness of the Hoffman dictum, the Treadwell
court chose not to rely upon it. Instead, a decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co.,4° apparently
guided the court's decision. The facts of that case were very similar
to those of Treadwell. An insurer who had been successful in having
an award reversed on appeal sought to recover payments it had been
compelled to make pending the appeal."' The insurer prevailed in the
lower court, but on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court the decision
was reversed.
In support of the lower court's decision, the insurer had argued
that reversal of the award was in fact a determination that the claim-
ant had not been entitled to compensation ab initio and that therefore
the claimant had no right to retain the payments. It argued further
that the Workmen's Compensation laws were for the protection of
those who were justly entitled thereto, and not intended to result in the
unjust enrichment of those not so entitled, contending that it was in-
conceivable to say that one should be permitted to retain money to
which he had no right in the first place.
under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Plaintiff sued to recover the money paid.
The defendant interposed several defenses, one of which was that a provision of the
law relating to review of awards on the ground of a change of conditions or proof of
erroneous wage rate provided that "no such review shall affect such award as regards
any moneys already paid." The court in rejecting the argument that this provision
barred the plaintiff's recovery reasoned that the statutory provision (which would deal
with recovery of overpayments caused by a prior erroneous determination) did not
apply to a situation where the workmen's compensation award was improper in its
inception.
38. See, e.g., Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete v. Young, 236 Miss. 550, 111 So. 2d
255 (1959).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 22 (McKinney 1965); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-35-45 (1968).
40. 196 Kan. 244, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966).
41. The Kansas Act also has a "no stay" clause requiring the continuance of
payments pending appeal. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-556 (Supp. 1967).
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The claimant responded that the Kansas Act had established and
provided a procedure of its own covering every phase of the right to
compensation, which procedure, it contended, was complete and ex-
clusive. If the legislature had intended that the payments could be re-
covered back it would have so provided.42 Furthermore, the claimant
argued, it was not the intent and spirit of the act to allow an employer
to "recover back" money paid under an award which had already been
spent by a claimant for living expenses.
While acknowledging that it found the insurer's unjust enrich-
ment argument appealing, the Kansas court accepted the claimant's
"exclusive remedy" theory that general rules of restitution were not
applicable.43 Proceeding upon the assumption that the legislature must
have anticipated that some awards would be reversed on appeal, the
court found significant the fact that it had not provided for recovery
of payments made pending appeal. Although silence of the legislature
rarely seems to be indicative of anything," the Kansas court offered
what it considered a reasonable basis for its conclusion by drawing
inferences from the context of the appeal provision.
Two sections of the Kansas Act in particular impressed the
Tompkins court as making the absence of a "recovery back" provision
more meaningful. The first was a section providing that if any com-
pensation awarded or any installment thereof is not paid when due
and this condition persists, an employee may make a written demand
for it. If, after this demand, payments have still not been made, the
entire amount of the award unpaid becomes due.45 Rather than merely
being allowed suit for the payments overdue, the workman is allowed
to recover the entire award. Since there is no reference to appeals or
to any right of the employer or insurer to recover this payment, the
accelerated payment seems to be a final disposition of the case. The
Tompkins court then examined a second provision which, it felt,
added meaning to the first. That section provides that at any time
before but not after a final payment has been made, the award may
be reviewed, both as to the amount of the award and as to the decision
42. 409 P.2d at 1003.
43. Id.
44. The late Justice Frankfurter was particularly skeptical of the search for legis-
lative "intent" and the practice of delving into the minds of the legislators. He sug-
gested that government sometimes attempts to solve problems by shelving them
temporarily. He stated further that "an omission at the time of enactment wheher
careless or calculated cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may
recommend the action." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 534, 538 (1947).
45. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-512(a) (1964).
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whether the employee was initially entitled to compensation.46 From
this provision, combined with the previous provision concerning ac-
celerated payments and the apparent finality thereof, the Kansas court
drew an inference that in Kansas payments. once made are to be con-
sidered "final," and hence unreviewable. This inference is further sup-
ported by reference to the fact that the most drastic remedy which the
Kansas review body has available is to cancel the award and end
compensation. 7
In Treadwell, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the
Maryland Act was substantially the same as the Kansas Act. In addi-
tion, it found significant the presence of an expedited appeal process in
both statutes.48 The court assumed that the possibility that an award
might be reversed on appeal was within the contemplation of the General
Assembly. Since no provision had been made for restitution, the court
concluded that it had been considered and rejected and that in lieu
thereof, the expedited appeal process was included in the Act. Surely,
the court opined, the expedited appeal provision could "hardly be said
to serve any purpose other than the mitigation of the employer's ob-
ligation to pay pending appeal." '49
Both of the aforementioned conclusions, that is, the purported
similarity of the two statutes and the alleged sole purpose of the ex-
pedited appeal process are quite arguably incorrect. The latter conclu-
sion appears questionable when the terms of the appeals provision and
the underlying policy of the Act are considered. Section 56 (a) pro-
vides that both employee and employer may appeal any decision of the
Commission."° In light of the fact that a decision of the Commission
may also be a denial of compensation or a limited award to a work-
man, the right to a quick appeal assumes great importance to the work-
man. Furthermore, section 56(b) shows that this possibility was con-
templated by the legislature, for it provided that should a worker be
awarded compensation on appeal, interest dating from the original
order would also be awarded.5 ' Since the underlying policy of the
46. Id. § 44-528.
47. Id.
48. 263 Md. at 436, 283 A.2d at 604.
49. 263 Md. at 438, 283 A.2d at 605.
50. In addition, a beneficiary or any person aggrieved may bring an appeal. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(a) (Supp. 1972).
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(b) (1964) provides:
Interest on compensation. - In all cases where compensation is awarded on
appeal, whether by an affirmance, reversal, or modification of an order of the
Commission, the claimant shall be entitled to receive, in addition to the com-
pensation awarded, interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on any in-
stallments of compensation not paid as they matured under the award of the
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Compensation Act was to provide quick and certain relief to an injured
workman, it seems likely that the necessity for an expedited appeal
process for the workman was the primary motive for its enactment,
rather than mitigation of the employer's duty to make payments
pending appeal.
While the Maryland and Kansas statutes are quite similar to each
other, it is actually only to the extent that they are similar to the
typical Workmen's Compensation Acts found in other states." The
Maryland Act contains no provisions similar to those upon which the
Kansas court relied in interpreting its statute. Nowhere are there
limitations placed upon the time for appeal, nor is there an "accelera-
tion clause" for failure to make payments. Although there is a provi-
sion for lump sum payments, these are limited to specific situations5 3
and are disfavored by the courts. 4 It is the absence of these two pro-
visions which renders the two statutes substantively different in this
case, for nowhere else in the Maryland Act does there seem to be an
implication that payments are final. Hence, while the Kansas Act may
be construed to imply finality of payments, the Maryland Act is silent
in this regard. If one accepts the theory that the quick appeal was
intended at least equally for the employee's benefit, that provision also
becomes silent as to any legislative intent with regard to recovery
back, and thus the statute as a whole appears silent.
Not only is the Maryland Act dissimilar to that of Kansas, but
it is substantially similar to that of Rhode Island, and it was only
upon the assumption that the Maryland and Rhode Island acts were
different that the Maryland Court of Appeals was able to distinguish
Merchants Mutual Insurance Co. v. Newport Hospital.5 That case,
if found indistinguishable from Treadwell, would have provided strong
support for allowing the insurer in Treadwell to recover the payments.
Merchants Mutual was a workmen's compensation insurer who, pur-
suant to an award, had been required to make payments to the claim-
ant pending appeal.56 On appeal, the insurer was successful in having
Commission or would have matured had the same compensation been awarded
by the Commission at the time of passing its order from which the appeal is taken.
52. See note 7 supra.
53. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 43, 49 (1964). Section 43 provides for a lump
sum payment if the claimant shall move out of the state, while section 49 gives the
Commission discretion to convert an award to a lump sum.
54. "The policy of the statute does not favor lump sum awards. They are the
exception rather than the rule." Petillo v. Stein, 184 Md. 644, 652-53, 42 A.2d 675,
679 (1945).
55. 272 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1971).
56. The Rhode Island Act also has a no stay provision. LI. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-35-33 (1968).
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the award reversed.57 It then sought to have the Commission include
in its final order a provision directing repayment of the moneys paid
by the insurer. The Commission refused, and the Rhode Island court
affirmed the refusal upon the grounds that the Commission did not
have the statutory authority to grant such relief.5" In dictum, how-
ever, the court noted that this did not bar an insurer from bringing a
civil action grounded on a theory of unjust enrichment.59 Following
this suggestion, the insurer brought suit against the employee, hospital
and physician for recovery of its payments to them and obtained a
judgment directing repayment. The hospital and physician appealed,
but the supreme court of the state held that recovery back could be
had. That court reasoned that the reversal of the Workmen's Com-
pensation award had the effect of nullifying the debt of the insurer to
the claimant. Therefore, even though money was received for pay-
ment of a justifiable debt it had been paid by a party who the court
had determined had no legal obligation to make such payments.60 The
aim of restitution, it stated, was to place the parties in status quo. To
allow the defendants to retain moneys received from the insurer would
be violative of that purpose and would result in their unjust enrich-
ment at the plaintiff's expense. Confronted with the absence of any
provision either allowing or precluding "recovery back" the court looked
upon the statute from a perspective different from that of the Mary-
land court. Whereas the Maryland court interpreted legislative silence
as a failure to allow "recovery back" and, therefore, an intent to pre-
clude it, the Rhode Island court saw it as a failure to prohibit it and
concluded that the court could not supply a provision which the legis-
lature had seen fit to omit. Therefore, because "recovery back" was
not prohibited, it should be allowed.
The conceptual difference between the Rhode Island and Mary-
land courts may be formulated in another fashion; it might be said
that whereas Rhode Island allows other remedies where the statute
is silent, Maryland adheres strictly to the doctrine of exclusivity. At
least two arguments can be advanced to rebut the contention that this
exclusivity doctrine governs the situation in Treadwell. First, it might
be argued that the Act is the exclusive remedy only where the Act
applies to the injured workman. In Treadwell, it was determined that
the injury was not an accidental one and, therefore, was not within
57. See Woods v. Safeway Systems, Inc., 101 R.I. 343, 223 A.2d 347 (1966).
58. See Woods v. Safeway Systems, Inc., 102 R.I. 493, 232 A.2d 121 (1967).
59. 232 A.2d at 332.
60. 272 A.2d at 332.
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the coverage of the Act.8" Thus, the Act was not the exclusive remedy
there because it was not intended to be so where the Act did not apply;
instead the legislature intended that persons not covered by the Act
should pursue their own remedies, and did not purport to govern
them. This argument may be countered, however, by arguing that al-
though the Act may not be the exclusive remedy where it does not
apply, the payments made in Treadwell were made pursuant to an
order under the Act and that therefore the Act was the exclusive
remedy because it provides a procedure for all actions taken under
the Act.
Another argument might be made to the effect that the Act is an
exclusive remedy but only that of the employee and not that of the
employer. Throughout the Act the language seems to be phrased only
in terms of the employees' remedies and the employer's liability, not of
the corresponding rights of the employer.62 As the statute is remedial
in nature, the primary focus of the legislation is upon providing relief
for the workman, and any incidental reference to the employer is co-
incidental. This argument is also subject to attack, first as being overly
technical, and second on the ground that in giving the employer the
right to appeal and the right to recover from a third party tort feasor 63
the statute has in effect enumerated remedies of the employer and has
therefore, upon entering this sphere, become the exclusive remedy of
the employer. However, a dispute over whether the statute is exclu-
sive seems to be an attempt to find legislative intent where none exists.
III.
Although the Treadwell decision is undoubtedly a happy result
for the workman, it portends a number of problems. First, to allow a
workman initially ruled to be compensable but eventually held not
compensable to retain payments made pursuant to the original order
results in unequal treatment to workmen in the same category because
another workman may have his claim denied initially and that denial
affirmed on appeal. Thus there are two employees, neither of whom is
entitled to compensation, but one of whom may receive substantial
61. This argument was advanced by Justice Schroeder in Tompkins. He con-
tended that the Kansas Act was the exclusive remedy only where there was a right
to compensation. 196 Kan. 244, 248, 409 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1966) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting).
62. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1972), provides in part "the
liability prescribed by the last preceding paragraph shall be exclusive ..
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (Supp. 1972).
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benefits and the other none at all. To attempt to deny the inequity by
asserting that the compensated former workman probably had a more
colorable claim and therefore was entitled to some compensation
would be similar to arguing that a jury could convict a man of a crime
but give him a light sentence because they were not truly convinced
of his guilt.
This analogy is also applicable to the policy of the Act. The
statute provides that a workman who meets the requirements of its
provisions shall be compensable; others not satisfying them shall not.
If the legislature had intended that those eventually determined not
compensable should receive some benefits, it could have provided
therefor, but instead it chose not to do so. Thus, the decision in Tread-
well may well be contrary to legislative intent to compensate only
those covered by the terms of the Act and to make the eventual de-
termination of non-compensability date back to the time of the injury.
Finally, if the result is defended upon the ground that denying
recovery back was intended to mitigate harsh effects of the strict defi-
nitions of the Act, the answer should be that if the legislature or for
that matter, the courts, considered the tests for compensability as
having harsh effects the proper remedy is to liberalize or liberally
construe those provisions or definitions.
The result in Treadwell may encourage an employer to refuse to
make payments pending appeal because if he makes payment and suc-
ceeds on appeal he has lost those payments. However, if he refuses
to pay under the statute the workman is probably only entitled to ob-
tain the benefits due to date since there is no accelerated payments
section as there is in the Kansas Act. 4 Thus, an employer seems to
have nothing to lose by stalling payments and perhaps much to gain
if he is successful on appeal.
At the close of his opinion for the court in Treadwell, Judge
McWilliams recognized that the court's determination of the policy
behind the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act as it relates to
recovery back may have been mistaken. He noted: "As we have said
we think the language of our statute . .. reflects a legislative intent
to preclude 'recovery back' upon any theory, except fraud perhaps.
If we are mistaken in this regard the General Assembly will know
how to enlighten us."815
Such an enlightenment by the General Assembly would not be
without precedent. In 1960 it took quick action to avoid the conse-
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-512(a) (1964).
65. 263 Md. at 439, 283 A.2d at 606.
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quences of the Court of Appeals decision in Waters v. State,66 a case
closely analogous to Treadwell. In Waters an employee discharged by
his employer applied for and obtained unemployment benefits. Later,
as a result of a union arbitrator's decision, Waters was reinstated with
back pay from the date of his discharge. Subsequently the State of
Maryland sued the employee for unemployment benefits which had
been paid him for the period in which he was compensated by his em-
ployer. The statute then provided only that the state could recover
benefits from a claimant if those payments were made by reason of the
nondisclosure or misrepresentation by him of a material fact."'
Despite the fact that this provision was included under a penalties
subtitle, the court applied the maxim expressio unis est exclusio alterius
and held that section 16(d) set up an exclusive and limited basis for
recovery from employees. The court concluded, therefore, that the
doctrine of unjust enrichment was inapplicable and that "recovery
back" could only be had by the state if the payments were a result of
a nondisclosure or misrepresentation. In the next session of the Gen-
eral Assembly section 16(d) was amended to allow recovery by the
state when a person has received benefits for which he is found to have
been ineligible.6" Whether or not this subsequent action of the Gen-
66. 220 Md. 337, 152 A.2d 811 (1959).
67. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 17(d) (1957) stated in part:
Any person who, by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation by him
or by another of a material fact (irrespective of whether such non-disclosure or
misrepresentation was known or fraudulent) has received any sum as benefits
under this Article while any conditions for the receipt of benefits imposed by this
Article were not fulfilled in his case, or while he was disqualified from receiving
benefits, shall, in the discretion of the Board, either be liable to have such sum
deducted from any future benefits payable to him under this Article or shall be
liable to repay to the Board for the unemployment compensation fund, a sum
equal to the amount so received by him, and such sum shall be collectible in the
manner provided in Section 14(f) of this Article for the collection of past-due
contributions.
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 17(d) (1969) provides:
Recoupment of benefits paid. - When any person has received any sum for
benefits for which he is found by the Executive Director to have been ineligible,
the amount thereof may be recovered from benefits payable to him or which may
be payable to him in the future, or in the manner provided in § 15(f) of this
article for the collection of past-due contributions. Such sums may be recouped
by either of these methods provided that whenever the Executive Director decides
that any sum received by the claimant shall be recouped, either because he has
received or has been retroactively awarded wages, was not unemployed as that
term is defined in this article, or was disqualified or otherwise ineligible for such
benefits, he shall promptly notify the claimant of his decision and the reasons
therefor. The decision and the notice shall state the amount to be recovered, the
weeks, with respect to which such sum was received by or paid to the claimant,
and the provision of the law under which it is found that the claimant was in-
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eral Assembly can be interpreted as an express rejection of the decision
is unimportant. What is of significance is that the legislature did ex-
press an intent that persons who have received benefits and are later
determined to have been ineligible shall be obligated to repay the money
received regardless of whatever hardship may ensue.
It is submitted that whether the Treadwell court was right or
wrong in determining the policy of the Maryland Workmen's Com-
pensation Act concerning recovery back, it should not have been placed
in the position of having to make such a determination. In all likeli-
hood the statute expresses no legislative policy at all on the matter.
The silence of the Act on the subject of recovery back is probably
attributable either to the fact that the question never arose or to the
fact that it arose and was subsequently ignored due to the difficulty of
establishing a policy between the competing equities. In either case, it
is incumbent upon the General Assembly, now that the question has
been clearly presented, to expressly adopt or reject the position taken
by the Maryland Court of Appeals.69
eligible. The Executive Director may reconsider his decision at any time within
one year after the date when it was made. Such decision or reconsidered decision
may be appealed within the time limits and under the procedure prescribed in § 7
of this article for appeal from a determination, but on appeal the issue shall be
limited to whether or not the claimant was ineligible during the weeks in question.
69. Other states have dealt with "recovery back" by statute. Oregon, for example,
has precluded "recovery back" in the following manner:
If the board or court subsequently orders that compensation to the claimant
should not have been allowed or should have been awarded in a lesser amount
than awarded, the claimant shall not be obligated to repay any such compensation
which was paid pending the review or appeal.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.313(2) (Supp. 1971-72).
New York, on the other hand, has provided:
An appeal to the appellate division of the Supreme Court, third department,
or to the Court of Appeals, shall not operate as a stay of the payment of com-
pensation required by the terms of the award. Where such award is modified or
rescinded upon appeal, the appellant shall be entitled to reimbursement in a sum
equal to the compensation in dispute paid to the respondent pending adjudication
of the appeal.
N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMp. LAW § 23 (McKinney 1969):
The General Assembly should amend the Maryland Workmen's Compensation
Act either to explicitly approve or reject Treadwell. Such an amendment could be
accomplished by interpolation into MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(a) (Supp. 1972),
after the sentence which provides that an appeal "shall not be a stay of any order of
the Commission directing payment of compensation .... " a sentence as follows: "If
the court shall subsequently reverse or modify the order of the Commission, the
claimant shall (not) be obligated to repay any compensation (and/or medical pay-
ments) paid pending the appeal."
